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Advances in risk management capabilities should make it profitable for major 
banks to rely on internal credit ratings to calculate Basel II capital requirements 
(.IRB approach). Firms and, more generally, market participants would benefit 
from the disclosure of these ratings. Banks, however, have no incentives to make 
their rating data publicly available. This paper proposes a regulatory framework 
to efficiently solve this incentive issue. It first shows that there are benefits in 
fostering the disclosure of internal ratings. In particular, it would reduce the cost 
of capital for both large and small borrowers while facilitating investor diversifi-
cation. 
To be sure, internal rating disclosure would also have its costs. For example, 
market volatility may increase, whereas lender-borrower relationships may 
—————————————————— 
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been published as ‘Using Basel II to Facilitate Access to Finance: The Disclosure of Internal 
Ratings’, in K.J. Hopt, et al., eds., Corporate Governance in Context (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2005) p. 511. 
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suffer. This paper argues that it is possible to design a regulatory framework 
under which the benefits of rating disclosure clearly outweigh its costs. Banks 
opting for the IRB approach would have to provide their internal ratings to one of 
several regional entities. The latter would consolidate the data collected and give 
each borrower a rating equal to the average of the ratings it gets from its lenders. 
The average rating would be disclosed to the public unless the borrower has 
opted for non-disclosure. Relying upon multiple regional entities may cause some 
uncertainty (a given firm may get diverging average ratings), but it would also 
reduce moral hazard effects and foster competition in the rating industry. 
 
Keywords: access to finance, Basel II, banking, capital requirements, disclosure, 





The Basel Capital Accord (also referred to as Basel I) was issued in 1988 by the 
Committee on Banking Supervision. It aimed at improving banking supervision 
by providing a credit risk measurement system and minimum capital standards. 
The Committee recently adopted a revised capital framework (also referred to as 
Basel II) that should be available for implementation by the end of 2007. Basel II 
aims at further improving banking supervision by integrating changes in risk 
management practices, in particular by allowing for greater use of banks’ internal 
systems as inputs to capital calculations. 
One of the core Basel II innovations is that it gives banks the option to calcu-
late credit risk (the risk that a borrower will default) – a calculation that will 
influence how much capital banks are required to have (so-called regulatory 
capital) – using one of two approaches. Banks may continue to use a revised 
version of the existing standardised approach, with the additional possibility of 
using external credit agencies to assess credit risk. Alternatively, they may choose 
to adopt a new and more sophisticated method to measure credit risk by opting for 
the internal rating based (IRB) approach.1 In theory, the IRB approach should 
bring regulatory capital requirements closer to credit risk profiles and result in 
major banks opting for the IRB approach. It is still too early to tell how many 
banks will in fact do so, but it seems a forgone conclusion that Basel II will 
contribute to internal ratings playing an increasingly important role in lending 
practices and pricing. 
—————————————————— 
1 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, updated November 2005, 
available at: <http://www.bis.org>. 
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Basel II has generated substantial discussion about the reduction in regulatory 
capital it is likely to generate. However, the transparency opportunities it offers 
have been largely ignored. In particular, practically no attention has been paid to 
the benefits of disclosing internal ratings. 
To be sure, there is awareness that information is incomplete in the credit 
market. Law-makers have attempted to improve rating information in various 
ways, in particular by regulating credit information providers and setting up 
public credit registries. However, the resulting rating information has suffered 
from limited coverage and remained restricted to select market participants. By 
itself, Basel II is unlikely to significantly change this situation. Banks have no 
incentive to make internal ratings public, as it is more profitable for them to keep 
this information private. This paper therefore proposes to address this incentive 
issue by requiring all banks opting for the IRB approach to publicly disclose their 
internal ratings. 
The externalisation of internal rating information should not result in signifi-
cant inconsistencies. National financial systems continue to differ due to country-
specific trade-offs,2 but there is a convergence trend. Financial intermediaries 
play an increasingly similar role in both market-oriented and (still) intermediary-
oriented systems. Operational firms, for their part, are increasingly subject to a 
common regulatory framework when it comes to external finance, as exemplified 
by the development of regulatory arbitrage within Europe, the convergence of 
venture capital contracts around the world and the harmonisation of disclosure 
requirements and practices. 
Against this background, requiring the disclosure of internal ratings would 
have the advantage of reducing the cost of capital for large and small firms alike. 
It would provide lenders and investors with a richer data set. Moreover, disclosure 
should improve rating reliability, facilitate investor diversification and decrease 
market uncertainty. Clearly, internal rating disclosure could also have its costs. It 
could increase market volatility and negatively affect inter-temporal risk alloca-
tion. It may also negatively affect lender-borrower relationships, which could 
result in adverse selection effects or make it more difficult for lenders to obtain 
rating information. 
This paper argues that it is possible to design a regulatory framework under 
which the benefits of rating disclosure clearly outweigh its costs, which in turn 
should minimise interest group opposition to the externalisation of banks’ private 
information. First, it would remain possible for banks to keep internal ratings 
confidential by opting to continue to use the standardised approach. Second, 
banks that opt for the IRB approach would not have to disclose the internal 
—————————————————— 
2 Compare P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ‘Complementarities and Systems: Understanding 
Japanese Economic Organization’, 9 Estudios Economicos (1994) p. 3; R.G. Lipsey and K. 
Lancaster, ‘The General Theory of Second-Best’, 24 Revue of Economic Studies (1956) p. 11. 
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ratings themselves, but would do so through one of several (public or private) 
regional entities. 
Third, regional entities would publicise ratings in consolidated form. Each 
borrower would get a rating corresponding to the average of the individual ratings 
it gets from its lending banks. This procedure would have several advantages. It is 
likely to improve rating quality (extremes will at least partly cancel each other 
out) and protect individual rating anonymity. It would also allow individual banks 
to keep a comparative advantage (or reduce a comparative disadvantage) if their 
internal rating differs from the disclosed average. Admittedly, overlapping 
disclosure by multiple regional entities may cause some uncertainty as a given 
firm may get diverging average ratings. However, rating multiplicity would also 
reduce moral hazard effects (excessive rating reliance would be prevented) and 
preserve competition by rating agencies (they could continue to offer uncertainty 
reducing services). 
Fourth, borrowers would be allowed to opt out. The availability of a non-
disclosure alternative would better protect borrowers against rating mistake risks. 
It would also minimise reductions in the information flow between borrowers and 
banks because of relationship-damaging disclosure. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the internal rating approach under the Basel II agreement. Section 3 
addresses information sharing issues in credit markets and the specific costs and 
benefits of requiring the disclosure of internal ratings. Section 4 sketches a simple 
regulatory framework under which this private information could be efficiently 
externalised with minimal interest group opposition. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. BASEL II AND INTERNAL CREDIT RATINGS 
 
The Basel Capital Accord was issued in 1988 by the Committee on Banking 
Supervision. It aimed at improving banking supervision by providing a credit risk 
measurement system and minimum capital standards. On 26 June 2004, the 
central bank governors and the heads of the bank supervisory authorities in the 
G10 countries approved a revised capital requirements framework, commonly 
referred to as Basel II, that should be available for implementation by the end of 
2007. Basel II aims at further improving banking supervision by integrating 
changes in risk management practices, in particular by allowing for greater use of 
banks’ internal systems as inputs to capital calculations and by providing banks 
with more risk-sensitive capital requirements.3 
One of the core Basel II innovations is that it gives banks the option to calcu-
late credit risk (the risk that a borrower will default) – a calculation that will 
—————————————————— 
3 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, op. cit. n. 1. 
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influence how much capital banks are required to have (so-called regulatory 
capital) – using one of two approaches. Banks may continue to use a revised 
version of the existing standardised approach. Regulatory capital to be kept by 
banks for credit risk will still equate to 8 per cent of their risk-weighted assets, but 
banks will be allowed to link risk weights to ratings provided by external credit 
assessment institutions, in particular credit rating agencies. 
Banks may alternatively choose to adopt a new and more sophisticated method 
to measure credit risk by opting for the internal rating based (IRB) approach. 
Under this approach, credit exposures must be categorised in five broad classes of 
assets: corporate, sovereign, bank, retail (which may include corporate exposures 
of less than €1 million) and equity. Banks can also distinguish between exposures 
to small and medium-sized firms and exposures to larger firms. 
Banks opting for the IRB approach will have to use internal ratings for credit 
approval, risk management and internal capital allocation purposes. As far as 
corporate exposures are concerned, the rating system must include a minimum of 
seven borrower grades for non-defaulted borrowers and one for those that have 
defaulted – with credit risk increasing from one grade to the next. A borrower’s 
grade must not only reflect its current financial condition.4 The grade must also 
indicate the borrower’s ability and willingness to contractually perform despite 
adverse economic conditions or the occurrence of unexpected events. In other 
words, there is a link between credit rating and probability of default.5 
The IRB approach should bring regulatory capital requirements closer to 
credit risk profiles and result in lower regulatory capital requirements.6 Taking 
into account that major banks across developed countries already make wide-
spread use of internal credit risk ratings,7 and that existing practices have 
influenced Basel II requirements, larger banks can be expected to opt for the IRB 
approach. It is still too early to tell how many banks will in fact do so. Moreover, 
only banks that have robust validation procedures will be allowed to use the IRB 
approach, meaning that supervisory approval is likely to be restricted to sophisti-
cated intermediaries. Nevertheless, it seems accepted that Basel II will result in 
—————————————————— 
4 Note that financial condition is influenced by financial as well as non-financial factors 
such as management quality and corporate governance. See, e.g., J. Grunert, et al., ‘The Role of 
Non-financial Factors in Internal Credit Ratings’, 29 Journal of Banking and Finance (2005) p. 
509. 
5 J.P. Krahnen and M. Weber, ‘Generally Accepted Rating Principles: A Primer’, 25 Jour-
nal of Banking and Finance (2001) p. 3. 
6 See, however, E.I. Altman and G. Sabato, ‘Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on 
Basel Capital Requirements for SMEs’, 28 Journal of Financial Services Research (2005) p. 15 
(pointing out that capital requirements will only be lower for banks that use the advanced IRB 
approach). 
7 See M. Carey and M. Hrycay, ‘Parameterizing Credit Risk Models with Rating Data’, 21 
Journal of Banking and Finance (2001) p. 197; Krahnen and Weber, loc. cit. n. 5. 
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internal ratings playing an increasingly important role in lending practices and 
pricing.8 
The increasing use of internal ratings does not imply that there is uniformity 
among banks in firm grading. Empirical studies show that there can be substantial 
differences among internal rating systems as well as in risk assessments.9 These 
differences will not disappear under Basel II, the regulatory framework being 
flexible and leaving room for diversity in implementation by individual banks. 
These differences, however, are unlikely to remain significant or prevent a 
comparative analysis of internal ratings. First, supervisory authorities will require 
banks using the IRB approach to establish that their ratings are consistent and 
meaningfully differentiate risk. This should minimise internal rating system 
divergence, as confirmed by the current trend towards using Standard & Poor’s 
26 borrower grade scale for internal rating purposes.10 Second, differences in 
rating methods and grades among the major external rating agencies (Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s in particular) do not prevent market participants from using 
and comparing them.11 
The increasing availability of comparable internal ratings naturally leads to the 
question of whether there would be benefits in lending banks sharing this infor-
mation with other credit market participants. 
 
 
3. INFORMATION SHARING 
 
It is well known that credit markets are characterised by incomplete information, 
but that the release of additional information may have adverse effects.12 Thus, 
the social advantages of sharing internal rating information will depend upon 
credit market information levels and disclosure costs and benefits. 
—————————————————— 
8 See also V. Redak, Risks, Ratings and Regulation: Toward a Reorganization of Credit via 
Basel II?, working paper (2005), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
9 See W.F. Treacy and M. Carey, ‘Credit Risk Rating Systems at Large US Banks’, 24 
Journal of Banking and Finance (2000) p. 167 (establishing differences in internal rating 
systems in the United States); T. Jacobson, et al., ‘Internal Ratings Systems, Implied Credit 
Risk and the Consistency of Banks’ Risk Classification Policies’, 30 Journal of Banking and 
Finance (2006) p. 1899 (establishing differences in credit risk assessment in Sweden). 
10  See E.I. Altman and A. Saunders, ‘An Analysis and Critique of the BIS Proposal on 
Capital Adequacy and Ratings’, 25 Journal of Banking and Finance (2001) p. 25. 
11  The difference between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ ratings is that the former are attributed 
by lenders for their own purposes whereas the latter are prepared for third party use by 
specialised providers (also called rating agencies). 
12  See generally F. Allen and D. Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MIT 
Press 2000). 
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3.1 Incomplete rating information 
 
Lenders often share information about borrowers’ credit history, this exchange 
being generally mediated by credit rating agencies, credit bureaus and public 
credit registers. 
Credit rating agencies rate firms that may or may not have solicited a credit 
evaluation. Credit rating agencies are the major providers of rating information 
and their opinions carry significant weight in financial markets. However, the 
credit rating industry comprises very few players, with Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s often being considered as having duopoly power. The significant role that 
credit rating agencies will play in relation to the Basel II standardised approach 
has also led various academics to point out the dangers of excess reliance upon 
agency ratings.13 Law-makers have therefore expressed competition concerns and 
worried about rating procedures, independence (ratings are generally solicited and 
paid for by borrowers themselves) and quality. Recent financial scandals have 
provided the impetus for regulatory intervention but have not (yet) resulted in the 
adoption of bidding regulation.14 
Credit bureaus assemble and distribute credit information voluntarily provided 
by affiliated lenders, mainly in the consumer credit area. Information distributed 
by credit bureaus is considered valuable,15 but here too a limited number of 
players dominate most markets, including the Australian, German, Japanese, UK 
and US markets.16 Moreover, credit bureaus only provide information on a 
reciprocal basis: lenders that do not provide credit information do not have access 
to credit information. 
Public credit registries are governmentally established credit bureaus. Super-
vised financial intermediaries are required to provide loan status data to their 
central bank or supervisory authority. Public credit registries exist in around 60 
countries, the precursors being Germany and France, and the region with the 
highest coverage in this regard is Latin America.17 However, the required loan 
status data is often very basic and static (banks essentially have to report whether 
—————————————————— 
13  See, e.g., G. Ferri, et al., ‘The Role of Rating Agency Assessments in Less Developed 
Countries: Impact of the Proposed Basel Guidelines’, 25 Journal of Banking and Finance 
(2001) p. 115. 
14  See C.A. Hill, ‘Regulating the Rating Agencies’, 82 Washington University Law Quar-
terly (2004) p. 43; Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies, OJ 2006 
C 59/2; IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (December 2004). 
15  See various contributions in M. Miller, Credit Reporting Systems and the International 
Economy (Boston, MIT Press 2003). 
16  See M. Pagano and T. Jappelli, ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets’, 48 Journal of 
Finance (1993) p. 1693. 
17  See A. Powell, et al., Improving Credit Information, Bank Regulation and Supervision: 
On the Role and Design of Public Credit Registries, working paper (2004), available at: <http:// 
papers.ssrn.com>. 
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a loan is in good standing, past due or in default) and access to credit information 
is normally only provided on a reciprocal basis.18 
Generally speaking, it appears that credit information sharing varies consid-
erably by country and credit market.19 Credit rating agencies provide influential 
information, but rating coverage is limited for smaller firms and emerging 
markets,20 whereas rating industry concentration and conflicts of interest raise 
rating quality issues. Private credit bureaus provide useful information too, but 
their focus is on consumer credit and access is limited to participating lenders. 
There is larger borrower coverage with public credit registries, but the rating 
information they provide is often rudimentary and access is normally limited to 
participating banks. 
In short, there is room for improvement in credit information sharing. In this 
context, the increased importance Basel II gives to internal ratings could offer 
new transparency opportunities. 
 
3.2 Internal rating disclosure under Basel II 
 
By itself, the use of internal ratings under Basel II is unlikely to significantly 
reduce imperfections in credit market information. Banks will have no incentive 
to systematically make all their internal ratings public, as it is more profitable for 
them to keep this information private.21 Rating intermediaries, for their part, 
cannot be expected to significantly increase rating coverage and access in the 
foreseeable future, whereas external rating quality will continue to be affected by 
independence and market concentration issues. 
Against this background, regulatory intervention could improve rating quality, 
especially in view of empirical evidence that it should make no difference 
whether credit information is distributed through private or public schemes.22 This 
paper therefore proposes to improve credit market information by requiring all 
banks opting for the IRB approach to publicly disclose their internal ratings.23 
—————————————————— 
18  Ibid. 
19  See A.J. Padilla and M. Pagano, ‘Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline 
Device’, 44 European Economic Review (2000) p. 1951. 
20  See, e.g., A. Powell, Basel II and Developing Countries: Sailing through the Sea of 
Standards, working paper (2004), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
21  See also Pagano and Jappelli, loc. cit. n. 16 (information sharing is unlikely to be volun-
tary for positive, non-default information). Banks may, however, selectively disclose internal 
ratings for public relation purposes, see n. 59 infra. 
22  T. Jappelli and M. Pagano, ‘Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country 
Evidence’, 26 Journal of Banking and Finance (2002) p. 2017. 
23  For a related proposal, although not focused on internal ratings, see Powell, et al., op. cit. 
n. 17 (suggesting that banks opting for the IRB approach could be required to gather and report 
specific data, possibly for distribution to other reporting banks or even to the public through 
credits registers). 
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There are, of course, pros and cons in requiring internal rating disclosure. 
However, the next two sections will show that there is no inconsistency risk in 
making internal rating available to the public and that the benefits of internal 
ratings disclosure should outweigh its costs.24 
 
3.2.1 Inconsistency risk 
 
Financial markets are generally divided into two categories, intermediary-oriented 
systems (basically continental European and Japanese systems) and market-
oriented systems (basically Anglo-Saxon systems). The difference in regimes 
brings the risk that harmonisation efforts will result in inconsistencies.25 On the 
other hand, we can observe a convergence towards market-oriented systems in all 
developed countries. Differences are not only being reduced by capital markets 
gaining in importance across countries. Financial intermediaries also contribute to 
the convergence trend by playing increasingly similar roles in both market-
oriented and (still) intermediary-oriented systems. 
Of course, differences among countries will not disappear in the near future. 
However, convergence significantly reduces the risk that internal ratings disclo-
sure requirements will result in significant inconsistencies. This conclusion is 
reinforced when considering regulatory arbitrage developments within Europe, 
the global standardisation of venture capital contracts and the harmonisation of 
disclosure requirements and practices. 
 
3.2.1.1 Regulatory arbitrage 
 
Three recent decisions by the European Court of Justice have made it markedly 
easier for new firms to incorporate in a Member State other than the one they 
conduct business in.26 There is some debate about whether these decisions will 
result in many firms engaging in regulatory arbitrage and in regulatory competi-
tion developing among Member States. What cannot be disputed, however, is the 
—————————————————— 
24  Note that it is not claimed here that the benefits of Basel II exceed its costs, but merely 
that taking Basel II as a given, it would be beneficial to require internal rating disclosure. On 
whether the overall costs of Basel II exceed its benefits, see, e.g., R.J. Herring, ‘Implementing 
Basel II: Is the Game Worth the Candle’, 14 Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 
(2005) p. 267. 
25  See R.H. Schmidt and M. Tyrell, ‘Information Theory and the Role of Intermediaries’, in 
K.J. Hopt, et al., eds., Corporate Governance in Context (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2005) p. 481; R.H. Schmidt and G. Spindler, ‘Path Dependence and Complementarity in 
Corporate Governance’, in J.N. Gordon and M.J. Roe, eds., Convergence and Persistence in 
Corporate Governance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004) p. 114; K. Pistor, et al., 
‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’, 8 Economics of Transition (2000) p. 325. 
26  See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering 
[2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
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increase in the number of firms choosing to be governed by UK law (a so-called 
outsider-controlled jurisdiction), even though they will operate in continental 
Europe (in so-called insider-controlled jurisdictions).27 It is also noticeable that 
France, Germany and the Netherlands have recently undertaken legislative 
reforms in the wake of UK regulatory changes.28 
These developments are likely to produce a three-stage outcome. First, most 
EU Member States will face a situation where closely-held firms operating on 
their territory will be governed by corporate laws that are enacted by another 
Member State. Second, if early US developments have any comparative value, the 
cohabitation of closely-held firms subject to different regimes is likely to produce 
converging corporate laws.29 Third, some closely-held firms will become public 
under the regulatory regime of a Member State other than the one in which they 
operate, putting high pressure on the latter Member State to adjust its own regime 
for publicly-held firms. As a result, the European regulatory framework govern-
ing access to external finance is likely to converge further, which in turn will 
reduce inconsistency risks. 
 
3.2.1.2 Venture capital contracts 
 
Whereas the US venture capital market is large and well-established, European 
venture capital activity was still close to non-existent in the mid-1990s.30 In recent 
years, however, venture capitalists have become increasingly active in Europe, 
with current European venture capital financing levels comparing favourably with 
US levels.31 
Interestingly, the development of the European venture capital market has 
gone hand-in-hand with a gradual replication of US practices. A keystone of the 
US venture capital market is that information asymmetries, conflicts of interest 
and uncertainties are dealt with through private ordering.32 Very early European 
attempts to develop a venture capital market relied upon governmental financing, 
—————————————————— 
27  See M. Becht, et al., Corporate Mobility and the Costs of Regulation, working paper 
(2006), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
28  See G. Hertig and J.A. McCahery, ‘Company and Takeover Law in Europe: Misguided 
Harmonisation Efforts or Regulatory Competition’, 4 EBOR (2003) p. 179. 
29  See also W.J. Carney, ‘The Production of Corporate Law’, 71 Southern California Law 
Review (1998) p. 715. 
30  B. Black and R.G. Gilson, ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks 
versus Stock Markets’, 47 Journal of Financial Economics (1998) p. 243. 
31  See the data published by the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(for Europe) and Thomson Venture Economics and National Venture Capital Association (for 
the United States). For example, funds raised for the European market in 2005 were up to about 
two-thirds of those raised for the US market (€12,700 billion and $22,260 billion respectively).  
32  R.G. Gilson, ‘Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Ex-
perience’, 55 Stanford Law Review (2003) p. 1067. 
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the usual European approach for risky projects, but were plagued by failures.33 
When experienced US venture capitalists started investing in Europe, they used 
the US-style contracts with which they were familiar. The available empirical 
evidence shows that the approach proved successful across jurisdictions, regard-
less of the applicable legal regime.34 
This result may reflect smaller than expected financial system divergence 
between the US and German poles,35 or rapid convergence due to German banks’ 
realisation that venture capitalism was likely to foster their lending activities.36 In 
any event, venture capital is a good example of the increasing similarity of 
financial systems and the potentially limited role of inconsistencies when it comes 
to external finance. 
 
3.2.1.3 Harmonised disclosure 
 
EU jurisdictions and Japan impose more stringent accounting and disclosure 
requirements on closely-held firms than the United States, whereas the latter 
regulates disclosure by public companies more heavily. Moreover, public 
corporations are subject to higher regulatory pressures in the United States when 
it comes to forward-looking information. 
However, market pressures have reduced the regulatory gap by forcing US 
closely-held corporations as well as European and Japanese public corporations to 
disclose more data than required by applicable regulation.37 In other words, 
despite claims about differences in governance regimes requiring separate modes 
of information processing to avoid prohibitive inconsistencies, market forces have 
contributed to the de facto harmonisation of disclosure practices. 
Law-makers are attempting to consolidate and extend the scope of conver-
gence in disclosure. For example, the more than 7,000 EU firms traded on 
regulated markets have been required to comply with Anglo-Saxon-oriented 
accounting standards.38 Similar policies are being implemented in Japan.39 Here 
—————————————————— 
33  R. Becker and T.F. Hellmann, ‘The Genesis of Venture Capital: Lessons from the Ger-
man Experience’, in C. Keuschnigg, et al., eds., Venture Capital Entrepreneurship and Public 
Policy (Cambridge, MIT Press 2004) p. 33. 
34  S.N. Kaplan, et al., How do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?, 
working paper (2004), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
35  See A. Bascha and U. Walz, Financing Practices in the German Venture Capital Indus-
try: An Empirical Assessment, working paper (2001), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
36  See T.F. Hellmann, et al., Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital, work-
ing paper (2003), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
37  See R.R. Kraakman, et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2004) pp. 71 and 193. 
38  See Regulation on the Application of International Accounting Standards, OJ 2002 L 
243/1. 
39  See C. Smith, ‘Called to Account’, Institutional Investor, December 2002, at p. 62; but 
see B. Jopson and D. Pilling, ‘Accounting Teams Struggle to Sing to a Similar Tune’, Financial 
Times, 9 March 2005, at p. 14 (convergence is a lengthy process). 
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again, the harmonisation path is not always smooth, and differences will remain 
in disclosure requirements or practices. However, those differences reflect 
diverging views about the costs and benefits of disclosure and cannot be regarded 
as a source of financial system inconsistencies. 
Summing up, the dynamics of regulatory arbitrage, globalisation of venture 
capital financing and disclosure harmonisation make it unlikely that requiring the 
disclosure of internal ratings will result in significant inconsistencies. 
 
3.2.2 Costs and benefits of disclosure 
 
The above conclusion does not, however, mean that the benefits of internal rating 
disclosure requirements exceed their costs. Requiring internal ratings disclosure 
can be expected to reduce the cost of capital, but the strategy may also have 
disadvantages in terms of data reliability, risk sharing, market uncertainty and 
rating providers. These potential trade-offs justify a more detailed cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2.1 Cost of capital 
 
Internal ratings disclosure is likely to provide investors with richer and possibly 
timelier information than currently available. This should reduce the cost of 
capital for both publicly-held and closely-held firms.40 
For listed firms or initial public offerings, the disclosure of internal ratings 
should lead to an increase in stock prices as investors will expect lower returns 
following the disclosure of private information.41 Similarly, larger non-listed 
firms should see a decrease in their cost of external finance. Banks’ regulatory 
capital requirements should be lower under the IRB approach than under a 
standard approach, which should allow large non-listed firms to profit from 
improved loan pricing.42 
Internal rating disclosure should make smaller non-listed firms more attractive 
for venture capitalists and private equity investors.43 It is indeed often difficult for 
smaller firms to get a reliable rating from external rating providers, either because 
—————————————————— 
40  See, e.g., A.J. Padilla and M. Pagano, ‘Endogenous Communication among Lenders and 
Entrepreneurial Incentives’, 10 Review of Financial Studies (1997) p. 205; J. Stiglitz and A. 
Weiss, ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’, 71 American Economic 
Review (1981) p. 393. 
41  See D. Easley and M. O’Hara, ‘Information and the Cost of Capital’, 59 Journal of 
Finance (2004) p. 553. 
42  See also M. Dietsch and J. Petey, ‘The Credit Risk in SME Loans Portfolios: Modeling 
Issues, Pricing, and Capital Requirements’, 26 Journal of Banking and Finance (2002) p. 303. 
43  For lending in general, see also T. Beck and A. Demirguc-Kunt, ‘Small and Medium-
Size Enterprises: Access to Finance as a Growth Constraint’, Journal of Banking and Finance 
(forthcoming). 
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smaller firms deem rating costs and risk not worth the reward or because there is 
insufficient supply of external rating capabilities. The externalisation of banks’ 
internal ratings information would therefore reduce venture capitalists’ and 
private equity funds’ cost of information gathering and processing.44 These 
financial intermediaries will thus be able to make better use of their information 
assessment capabilities, in turn facilitating smaller firms’ access to finance. 
 
3.2.2.2 Data reliability 
 
Borrowers generally have long-standing relationships with one or several banks, 
giving the latter privileged access to firm-specific information. Hence, major 
banks can be expected to have liquidity and solvency information that covers a 
larger set of borrowers and is at least as reliable as information held by credit 
rating providers. 
On the other hand, an analysis of insolvencies throughout the twentieth cen-
tury would reveal many examples of uninformed lenders. It is also probable that 
current pressure to cut costs will result in some lenders lacking adequate monitor-
ing capabilities. Remember, however, that only sophisticated banks will get 
supervisory approval to use the IRB approach. Internal ratings disclosure will thus 
be limited to banks with validated tools and procedures. 
To be sure, regulatory approval will not eliminate the risk of internal credit 
ratings being based on deficient information or biased because of banks’ regula-
tory capital interest in tampering ratings.45 Switching from the standardised to the 
IRB approach could also result in excessive reliance on models, which may 
increase systemic errors (if many banks use similar models) and lead to the 
disregard of critical subjective information (such as failure to pass the ‘smell 
test’). 
Nevertheless, these risks should not be overestimated. First, banks use internal 
ratings for multiple purposes, including the calculation of bonuses. The banks’ 
own employees can thus be expected to object to significant rating tampering for 
regulatory capital purposes unless a second set of ratings is used for bonus 
purposes, which in turn can be expected to be opposed by external auditors. 
Second, the race for competitive advantages and differences in corporate cultures 
are likely to make internal ratings vary from lender to lender, a phenomenon that 
can already be observed across rating agencies. This should improve the supervi-
sory authorities’ capability to detect anomalies in a timely manner and prevent 
blind reliance on faulty models. Third, model dependence issues should not 
prevent internal ratings from being as reliable as currently available rating data. 
—————————————————— 
44  See also A.W.A. Boot, et al., ‘Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms’, 19 Review of 
Financial Studies (2006) p. 81 (credit ratings provide a ‘focal point’ for firms and their investors). 
45  See R. Kirstein, ‘The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks’, 
21 International Review of Law and Economics (2002) p. 393; Carey and Hrycay, loc. cit. n. 7. 
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As indicated, banks are generally at least as well informed as rating agencies. 
Moreover, banks should face lower reputation and liability risks when signifi-
cantly downgrading a borrower than firms that sell rating data. Indeed, the move 
would reflect prudential rather than informational considerations, reducing the 
likelihood of market or judicial sanctions. 
One could argue, however, that the reliability advantage of internal ratings 
may end up being an issue by itself. First, it may result in excessive investor 
reliance. However, this potential moral hazard effect should not be overestimated. 
Adding internal rating to external rating information can, as we shall see, be a 
source of stock price volatility and this should keep investor reliance within 
acceptable limits. In addition, it is possible to further reduce moral hazard effects 
by institutionalising multiple rating sources (see section 4). 
Second, bank disclosure of low internal grades may have stigma effects, espe-
cially for listed firms with small-sized capitalisation or for very small firms. 
External rating firms may pay limited attention to small caps, which could 
magnify the impact of lower internal rating disclosure. Very small firms may 
have only one rating, the one provided by their single bank, and downgrades 
could make it very difficult for them to get alternative sources of finance. 
The fact that the stigma effect could increase the cost of capital for certain 
firms does not necessarily mean that it is a source of inefficiency. For small caps, 
the stigma effect is likely to merely reflect the improved and timelier nature of 
rating information. For very small firms, the stigma effect may remain a hypo-
thetical one to the extent they are less likely to borrow from banks who use the 
IRB approach. 
 
3.2.2.3 Risk sharing 
 
Disclosure could increase risk sharing opportunities. First, the availability of 
major banks’ internal ratings may decrease the probability that unsophisticated 
lenders using the ‘crude’ standardised approach will take uninformed lending 
risks.46 
Second, internal rating disclosure should facilitate investor portfolio diversifi-
cation. The number of rated firms will increase and the granularity of existing 
credit ratings should improve, especially given the trend towards general use of a 
harmonised rating scale. Moreover, the observation that rating agencies’ tend to 
give better ratings to those firms that solicit their services.47 should loose its force 
or, at least, be balanced by the availability of internal ratings. 
—————————————————— 
46  See B. Rime, The New Basel Accord: Implications of the Co-existence between the 
Standardized Approach and the Internal Ratings-based Approach, working paper (2003), 
available at: <http://www.szgerzensee.ch>. 
47  See W.P.H. Poon, ‘Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Biased Downward?’, 27 Journal of 
Banking and Finance (2003) p. 593. 
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Third, internal rating information should make investors less prone to become 
victims of conflicts of interest. This is especially true for investors that have their 
assets managed by financial intermediaries that also act as corporate lenders.48 In 
such situations, the disclosure of internal ratings will make it more difficult for 
asset managers to ‘stuff.’ debt instruments that are unpalatable into the discretion-
ary portfolios of unsuspecting investors. 
On the other hand, internal rating disclosure may also reduce risk-sharing 
opportunities. Banks have a comparative advantage in handling inter-temporal 
risk sharing, due to their ability to allocate risk and smooth consumption over 
time.49 However, this advantage presupposes that households have at least part of 
their financial wealth in the form of deposit accounts rather than securities. If so, 
and should internal rating disclosure result in households transforming fixed 
claims against banks into securities, inter-temporal risk sharing may decrease. 
Whether the net effect of internal ratings disclosure will be an increase or a 
decrease of risk-sharing opportunities is ultimately an empirical question. It 
would, however, be rather surprising to see the potential costs in terms of inter-
temporal risk sharing end up exceeding the sum of all the above-mentioned risk 
sharing benefits. 
 
3.2.2.4 Market uncertainty and volatility 
 
The availability of internal ratings in addition to existing external ratings should 
decrease market uncertainty. First, the self-selection bias inherent to external 
ratings should be balanced by the availability of internal ratings. Second, market 
participants will be able to rely on a broader rating sample and get a better picture 
about the extent to which there is consensus on a given firm’s solvency. Third, 
internal rating disclosure could provide additional methodology information. The 
methodology used by banks under the IRB approach will be known to supervi-
sory authorities, who can be expected to make the main rating parameters public 
so as to streamline IRB approval procedures and facilitate regulatory monitoring. 
The disclosure will not only benefit users of internal ratings, but could also put 
pressure on other rating providers to provide additional information about their 
own methodology. 
Internal ratings disclosure may also lead to a decrease in stock price volatility. In 
particular, banks should prove faster than other providers of solvency data in adjust-
ing ratings to changes in circumstances.50 Investors would thus get information that 
—————————————————— 
48  See P. Bolton, et al., ‘Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision, and Competition in 
the Financial Services Industry’, Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming 2006). 
49  See Allen and Gale, op. cit. n. 12; J. Hirshleifer, ‘The Private and Social Value of Infor-
mation and the Reward to Inventive Activity’, 61 American Economic Review (1971) p. 561. 
50  See also E.I. Altman and H.A. Rijken, ‘How Rating Agencies Achieve Rating Stability’, 
28 Journal of Banking and Finance (2004) p. 2679; S. Claessens and G.C.M.W. Embrechts, 
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is timelier, which should permit more accurate pricing and reduce stock price 
volatility. However, the benefits of timeliness should not be overestimated, as it 
may also increase stock price volatility. This could be the case, for example, if 
there is significant variance in rating across banks, a large increase in the fre-
quency of rating reversals or if rating disclosure has procyclicality effects due to 
all banks making similar up/down rating changes in response to economic 
recession/expansion.51 
 
3.2.2.5 Rating providers 
 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, credit rating agencies are also likely to benefit from 
the disclosure of banks’ internal ratings. It should reduce their liability risk when 
providing corporate ratings to banks using the standardised credit risk approach.52 
Credit rating agencies will be able to refer to internal ratings to either justify their 
call (if internal and external ratings are similar) or hedge their bets (if external and 
internal ratings diverge). Moreover, the availability of internal ratings as a new 
source of information should decrease the risk of rating agencies becoming 
burdened by heavy regulation or investigated by competition authorities. Indeed, 
the availability of internal ratings will make it harder to pin the blame for market 
failures on rating agencies or to establish their market dominance. 
By contrast, it could be costly for banks to disclose their internal ratings.53 
First, free-riders could take advantage of lenders that disclose their internal 
ratings. For example, some lenders may decide to gain a competitive advantage 
by relying on other lenders’ internal ratings while refraining from disclosing their 
own. Or, to take another example, a disclosing bank’s counter-party could use the 
rating information to asymmetrically improve its trading or bargaining position. 
These costs, however, should be at least partly balanced by internal rating 
disclosure reducing the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, the disclosure of 
internal ratings makes it easier to spot those banks still governed by the standard-
ised approach that take advantage of the latter’s being capital lenient towards 
high-risk borrowers to engage in under-priced lending.54 
—————————————————— 
Basel II, Sovereign Ratings and Transfer Risk: External versus Internal Rating, working paper 
(2003), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
51  See also M.B. Gordy and B. Howells, ‘Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we Treat the Dis-
ease without Killing the Patient’, 15 Journal of Financial Intermediation (2006) p. 395; G. 
Löffler, ‘Ratings versus Market-based Measures of Default Risk in Portfolio Governance’, 28 
Journal of Banking and Finance (2004) p. 2715. 
52  Basel II provides that lenders using the standardised approach must have their credit risk 
measurement supported by external credit assessments. 
53  See also Kirstein, loc. cit. n. 45. 
54  See also P. Van Roy, Credit Rationing and the Standardized Approach to Credit Risk in 
Basel II, working paper (2005), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com> (showing that the 
incentives for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardised approach is limited). 
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Second, banks could expose themselves to significant liability. Borrowers 
could face higher than justified costs of capital or even be made insolvent by 
being rated below what they should be. Investors or creditors could suffer 
significant losses because they have been misled by rating mistakes or delayed 
updates. 
Third, banks’ relationships with borrowers could suffer from the disclosure of 
internal ratings. On the one hand, potential disagreements over ratings having a 
larger effect, it could become more difficult for banks to get free and untainted 
access to borrower information. On the other hand, disclosure may raise new 
adverse selection and moral hazard issues.55 For any given bank, underrated 
borrowers will look for other sources of finance whereas overrated borrowers will 
stay put. Moreover, borrower discipline may decrease as defaulting could be less 
of a stigma than it is in the absence of internal ratings disclosure. 
These disadvantages explain why banks do not voluntarily engage in the sys-
temic disclosure of internal ratings, but do not imply that a disclosure requirement 
would be inefficient. As the next section will show, bank disclosure disadvan-
tages can be minimised under an adequate regulatory framework. 
Summing up, the costs of mandating the disclosure of internal ratings are 
unlikely to exceed its benefits. Admittedly, mandatory disclosure could increase 
the ‘flawed model’ costs of the IRB approach and negatively affect inter-temporal 
risk sharing. However, the link between the adoption of a disclosure requirement 
and the occurrence of these disadvantages seems weak, as other factors are likely 
to play a much more significant role. The only real objection to requiring disclo-
sure has to do with its potential costs for lending banks, an issue that can be dealt 
with by the proper design of the regulatory framework. 
 
 
4. SKETCHING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
It is relatively easy to design a disclosure of internal ratings procedure. Major 
legal issues could be avoided by integrating into Basel II a provision according to 
which the use of the IRB approach is contingent upon the public disclosure of 
internal ratings. The effort and time needed to achieve international harmonisa-
tion would thus be significantly reduced. Constraints on banks could also be kept 
low. On the one hand, banks could still avoid disclosure by opting for the 
standardised approach. On the other hand, compliance costs would be minimal for 
those banks opting for the IRB approach, as their choice would mean that there 
are almost no transactions costs in disclosing internal ratings.56 
—————————————————— 
55  See Jappelli and Pagano, loc. cit. nn. 16 and 22. 
56  See also L. Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation, working 
paper (2004), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
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However, market participants as well as banking supervisors can be expected 
to oppose this ‘simple’ procedure. First, banks may argue that internal rating 
disclosure would significantly increase their liability risk (i.e., borrowers, 
investors or creditors could claim to have been damaged by erroneous, misleading 
or untimely ratings) and facilitate competitor access to business secrets, in 
particular rating procedures and methods.57 Banks may also stress that internal 
rating disclosure will damage their relationship with borrowers and allow other 
market participants to take advantage of the revealed exposures. 
Second, borrowers may resist internal rating disclosure on the ground that 
loans are subject to trigger clauses that provide termination rights in case of 
downgrading, a scenario that could become more likely if internal ratings are 
disclosed (the assumption being that internal ratings would be more sensitive and 
timely than external ratings). In addition, small caps and very small borrowers are 
likely to object to the requirement because of its perceived stigma effects. 
Third, rating agencies will oppose any development that could end up damag-
ing their own relationship with borrowers, in particular a requirement that would 
force them to disclose proprietary information.58 
Fourth, supervisory authorities may object to internal rating disclosure be-
cause of the potential moral hazard effect of disclosing data generated by systems 
they have vetted. Lenders, investors and creditors may consider the internal 
ratings as backed by supervisors and thus reduce their own information gathering 
and processing efforts, the perception being that ‘guilty’ supervisors will arrange 
for a bail-out in case of major borrower insolvency. 
The validity of several of these possible objections is debatable and it is uncer-
tain whether and how strongly they will be voiced. For example, one may doubt 
that the disclosure of internal ratings will significantly increase lender liability 
risk considering that credit information is routinely shared through credit bureaus 
and public register offices. Or, to take another example, the extent to which the 
disclosure of internal ratings may reveal business secrets remains unclear, 
especially in view of major banks selectively disclosing some internal ratings for 
public relations purposes.59 
Nevertheless, interest group opposition is most likely to prevent the adoption 
of a straightforward conditionality approach. The efficiency and political econ-
omy issues raised by the disclosure of internal ratings must thus be dealt with 
—————————————————— 
57  See H. Merkt, ‘Creditor Protection through Mandatory Disclosure’, 7 EBOR (2006) p. 95. 
58  See, e.g., C. Batchelor, ‘Rating Agencies Win Rule Victory’, Financial Times, 28 De-
cember 2004, at p. 16 (reporting IOSCO’s abandonment of a proposal to require rating agencies 
to make public confidential information obtained from companies seeking a rating). 
59  See, e.g., ‘Nachlassender Trend zu Höheren Bonitätsnoten, CS veröffentlicht 
Kredithandbuch 2006’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28 June 2006, at p. 27 (mentioning that Credit 
Suisse, UBS, Zürcher Kantonalbank and Bank Vontobel regularly disclose select internal 
ratings to the media and investors alike). 
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under a more refined regulatory framework. This paper thus proposes the adop-
tion of a three-step approach. First, internal ratings would be disclosed by a third 
party and as averages. Second, there would be multiple third party disclosure. 
Third, borrowers would be given the right to opt out. 
 
4.1 Third party disclosure 
 
Requiring disclosure through a third party rather than directly by banks has 
several advantages. First, it puts some liability distance between banks and 
disclosure, which should contribute to keeping the lenders’ litigation risk within 
acceptable limits. Second, it mimics the procedure adopted for other credit 
information sharing schemes, such as those relying upon credit bureaus and 
public credit registers. Third, it should foster competition in the rating agency 
industry. 
Admittedly, the designation of the disclosing third party could raise credibility 
issues. The third party must be perceived as competent and unlikely to abuse its 
privileged access to rating information. To minimise these issues, it may be 
necessary, at least in the initial stage, to put a public entity in charge of the 
distribution of internal rating information – central banks being among the 
possible candidates, as exemplified by the public credit registry experience in 
general and the Banque de France firm scoring practice in particular.60 
In addition, third party disclosure would make it possible to institutionalise the 
publication of average ratings. As most borrowers deal with more than one major 
bank, the third party would be able to consolidate the various ratings a firm gets 
and disclose an ‘average’ to market participants. Individual banks’ ratings would 
thus remain anonymous, which would further distance banks from the process and 
reduce direct effects on bank-borrower relationships. Moreover, the disclosure of 
average ratings would allow better informed banks to keep a competitive advan-
tage while giving less informed banks an opportunity to revise their analysis, or 
even reconsider the robustness of their IRB approach. The disclosure of averages 
could also reduce excessive subjectivity risks, as well as rating biases, because of 
the regulatory capital advantages in tampering ratings upwards or the negotiation 
value of imposing a below market grade upon a recalcitrant borrower.61 
There are, however, various methodology issues relating to the disclosure of 
average ratings. First, major banks are unlikely to use uniform rating procedures, 
and differences in the nature and importance of their relationship with individual 
—————————————————— 
60  S. Foulcher, et al., La Structure par Termes des Taux de Défauts et Ratings, working 
paper (2004), available at: <http://www.banque-france.fr>. 
61  See, e.g., A. Klein, ‘Credit Raters’ Tactics in Pursuing New Work Frustrate Companies’, 
Wall Street Journal Europe, 25 November 2004, at p. A1 (reporting that borrowers, for cost 
reasons, refuse to ask for an external rating where sanctioned by the unsolicited disclosure of 
low-grade ratings). 
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borrowers may affect the relevance of their ratings.62 However, supervisory 
approval of IRB systems should prevent differences from being significant 
enough to make ratings inconsistent.63 In addition, the existence of differences in 
methodology should contribute to smoothing the effect of rating biases. 
Second, the disclosure of averages may mislead market participants insofar as 
they underestimate the extent to which major banks diverge in their estimation of 
the credit risks associated with an individual borrower. To deal with this issue, the 
disclosing third party could be required to single out borrowers with significant 
rating divergence or even to provide standard deviation data. 
Third, the disclosure of averages raises accountability and transparency issues. 
Individual banks cannot be accountable for a borrower’s aggregate score, which in 
turn cannot be traced to a specific lender. Moreover, an average rating leaves a 
black box as far as key risk drivers are concerned. To reduce the accountability 
issue, it may be necessary to identify the banks (but not the ratings) that have 
provided the data on which the average is based. It is more difficult to address the 
black box issue. This is probably an area where market participants will have to rely 
on other rating providers should they want to get a deeper credit risk understanding. 
 
4.2 Multiple rating disclosure 
 
Given that large borrowers have relationships with major banks around the world, 
disclosure could be organised so as to take place through multiple third parties. 
For example, US banks would report their internal ratings to a US-based third 
party, whereas EU and Japanese banks would report theirs, respectively, to an 
EU-based or Japan-based third party. 
Having multiple ratings for one borrower may cause some uncertainty, but this 
would contribute to a reduction in liability risks and moral hazard effects. 
Uncertainty would make it more difficult for investors and creditors to attribute 
insolvency-related losses to a single third party, bank or supervisor. It would also 
prevent excessive internal rating reliance by market participants and leave those 
best placed to monitor borrowers with an incentive to do so. In addition, having 
multiple rating disclosures would avoid giving excessive power to any third party 
and, presumably, foster competition in the rating industry. 
 
4.3 Opting out 
 
Finally, each borrower could be given the right to avoid disclosure by instructing 
its banks not to provide its internal rating to the disclosing third parties. Allowing 
—————————————————— 
62  R. Elsas, ‘Empirical Determinants of Relationship Lending’, 14 Journal of Financial 
Intermediation (2005) p. 32. 
63  See section 2 supra. 
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borrowers to opt out would significantly reduce the potential for stigma effects as 
well as the risk that disagreements over ratings end up damaging lending relation-
ships. 
At the same time, the availability of such an option is unlikely to result in a 
significant number of borrowers opting out. Firms that opt out would have to 
explain to their investors or creditors why they do not want their internal ratings 
to be disclosed. This should limit the exercise of opt-outs to those instances where 
borrowers have solid reasons to oppose disclosure. 
 
4.4 Minimising interest group opposition 
 
The proposed framework should minimise opposition to the disclosure of internal 
ratings. Investors can be expected to welcome a requirement that improves 
transparency, facilitates portfolio diversification and reduces the risks related to 
conflicts of interest. Similarly, the majority of borrowers should be in favour of a 
mechanism that is likely to reduce the cost of external finance while leaving a 
possibility to opt out. 
Rating agencies and major banks could prove less enthusiastic. However, 
rating agencies should be quick to realise that the uncertainties inherent in the 
proposed framework leave them sufficient room for the provision of value-added 
services while reducing the risk of regulatory intervention because of rating 
deficiencies or insufficient competition. Major banks, for their part, could have an 
interest in being given an opportunity to calibrate their internal ratings against 
average ratings. To be sure, both rating agencies and banks may still find the 
status quo as interesting or even preferable, but it is unclear why they would 
engage in a major lobbying effort to oppose a reform that does not cost them 
much. 
Finally, supervisory authorities should prove supportive of a disclosure re-
quirement that improves transparency, allows for multiple cross-checks of 
internal ratings and leaves room for enough uncertainty to avoid moral hazard 
effects. More importantly, supervisory authorities should be willing to implement 
a mechanism that is likely to improve financial stability by providing more timely 
warnings of an industry-specific, country-specific or more general deterioration of 
the economy, especially considering that they drafted Basel II with the aim of 





This paper argues that the Basel II accord provides an opportunity to efficiently 
externalise internal rating information across jurisdictions, regardless of the 
orientation of their financial system. 
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It is thus proposed to require the disclosure of the internal ratings of those 
banks that adopt the IRB approach for calculating capital requirements. Disclo-
sure would occur in averaged form through multiple third parties, whereas 
borrowers would be allowed to opt out to prevent outsiders from having access to 
their internal ratings. 
This framework would minimise the disadvantages of disclosure while pre-
serving its advantages. As a consequence, one could expect interest group 
opposition to prove too weak to prevent its implementation. 
